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1. Introduction - the dynamics of transition
The choices for the countries in transition in Eastern Europe has been compared with
the situation for a person with a specific dis ase. A specific disease needs a specific
treatment. However, it can be questioned whether the "patients" in Eastern Europe
in fact are in the same situation. Although the transition certainly has a lot of
elements in common there are also important differences between the countries
which makes specificly adjusted cures more relevant. The specific disease and the
treatment depends on the specific conditions at the start of the transition. Further-
more, the culture, preferences of the population and the relative strength of social
groups are different and will open up for different paths of transition.
An analysis of the transition process will, therefore, have to consider not only the
specif c economic conditions for the process, but also the specific culture, the
specific geographical and technical conditions and first of all the specific distribution
of power between different social groups. To analyse this it is necessary with a
holistic analysis of the transition process. In the book "Societies  in Transition"
(Mygind, 1994) I have developed such a holistic model. The model have been used
for an analysis of the transition process in the Baltic Countries (Mygind, 1996a).
This article is a short version of this analysis.
Figure 1 illustrates the society with four sub-systems and the surrounding world and
it shows the main dynamic relations between these elements. The institu ional
system is the formal rules governing the political processes and the coordination of
the economy. The production system is the resources of society - nature, physical
means of production and human knowledge. It is also the structure and the results
of production. The value system is the basic culture of society. The values, norms
and preferences of the inhabitants and the informal coordination of society. The
social system is the different social groups and their interaction with each other. This
system includes the distribution of power, income and wealth. The social groups can
change the institutional system. This happens in politics, also shown i the figure.
The barriers of the transition can be found in each of the subsystems and in the
interaction between them.
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The most important change will take place in the institutional system: On the
political level this includes a new democratic constitution with rules for the
distribution of political power between president, parliament, central and local
governments and the rules for election to these bodies. On the economic level the
transition from plan to market includes iberalization, that is: decentralization of
decision, information and motivation to independent market units. This include
liberalization of prices, international trade, banking etc. and it includes the legislative
framework for the operation of private enterprises. Parallel to liberalization will it
be necessary to make stabilization to secure macroeconomic conditions without
inflationary pressure. Finally is it necessary to change the incentive structure in the
state owned enterprises. This includes privatization, and it has turned out to be the
most difficult task in the transition process. 
Both the change of political and economic institutions involves serious social
conflicts because these institutions will make the framework for the future
distribution of power, income and wealth. This is especially the case for privatization
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connected to stabilization and liberalization means drastic changes in distribution
and economic cuts for many social groups. Therefore, there is a high risk that the
new democracy will be exhausted by the heavy burden of creating the legislative
framework for the new system in a situation of drastic social change. The institu-
tional change not only meets social barriers. There are also serious technical and
practical problems in creating and implementing the new legislation. The ideal
situation would be to implement all the new institutions in one step. But this is
impossible since many of the elements of transition take time. Some steps must be
taken before others, meaning that many solutions will only be partial. There will be
many holes in the system that can be exploited by entrepreneurial people in the new
private sector and in the state bureaucracy. Much effort will be used in speculation
on the lack of consistency in legislation instead of using the human resources to
restructure production.  
The bariers in the institutional system is very much connected to the barriers for
change in the social system. Although the change in the political institutions will
mean a change of persons in the upper level of the state bureaucracy, many
administrators from the old nomenclatura will continue on important positions. They
will themselves be the administrator  of the transition of power away from the state
bureaucracy. They will to a certain extent have the possibility to use their positions
to convert their power resources to fit into the new system. The "wild privatization"
is an example where the former power resources connected to the planning-
institutions are converted to economic power resources. Th  people belonging to the
former elite use their positions and personal relations to transfer the assets of the
state owned firms to new private firms owned by themselves. This can be done by
favorable contracts for these private firms in transactions of goods and assets with
the state owned firm.
The change in the rules involves social conflict, and at the same time it t kes time
to develop a system for balancing different interests. This system of interes
representation a d negotiation covers both the institutional and the social system.
The social system fills out the framework set by the institutional system. But the lack
of stability in the social system influence the development in politics and the change
in the institutional system. After the initial shift in power and the victory for the
groups favoring democracy and market, the expectations of the majority have often
been unrealistic. Experience from other countries in transition shows that the social
groups who have been the backbone of the social pressure for change will be losers
in the initial stage of transformation (Rosati, 1992). How will these groups react
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Closely connected to this question is the problem of organizing different interest
groups both in the form of unions and political parties. The social situation is
changing rapidly for many people, and it is difficult for them to define their own
interests and political opinions. These problems are extended by the lack of
knowledge of the consequences of different strategies in the process of transition.
This explains the instability in the party-system in many countries in transition.
Voters, party members and even many parliament members realize in the process
that the proposed strategy of their party has other consequences than they expected,
and then they shift to another strategy. This is not only the result of lack of political
experience. This is rather the result of the lack of transparency of the complex
process of transition. There is no clear theory or former experience to learn from.
Unfortunately the lack of stability in the social system might imply a lack of stability
in politics and for the strategy of economic tra sition. This can be the start of a "bad
circle" illustrated in figure 1.
The reaction of different social groups can be expect d to depend on the develop-
ment in production, that is the development of the production system. Also in this
system very important barriers can be found: The structure of production in the
typical command economy was based on large monopolistic firms mainly in sectors
of heavy industry and military production. The best resources were used in military
production. In other industries the technology were often outdated and especially in
the heavy industry extensively energy-consuming. The service sector and especially
the trade system were underdeveloped and the infrastructure for transport and
telecommunication were also in a very bad shape compared to the standard in
developed market economies. The production system was fit for a special basket of
goods chosen by the bureaucracy. When the market system is implemented, the
production system shall produce a very different basket of goods, now governed by
the preferences of the consumers in th  domestic market and the competitiveness of
the enterprises in the world market. The transition from the "plan-basket" to the
"market-basket" will mean a drastic change in production. When the world market
prices are introduced it will be evident that some firms have turned valuable inputs
(energy and other raw materials) into less valuable outputs. These firms have not
made production but destruction according to the measure stick of the world market
(Hare and Hughes, 1992). Other firms produce positive value added, but not enough
to cover their cost of labor and capital. The remaining fir s make a profit, and some
perhaps a huge profit because they possess a monopoly position in the local market,
or the demand initially exceeds the supply so that there will be a bottleneck for 
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The restructuring of the production system will take time and it will demand a huge
amount of capital. Unprofitable production units can be closed down quickly, but it
takes time and investment to build up new areas of production. In this barrier lies
one of the main reasons behind the drastic fall in production seen in all the countries
in transition. It is a paradox that the low priority of consumption in the former
command economy will continue for some time due to the need of investment to
build up a competitive sector for consumption goods. Initially there will be a strong
pressure for imports of Western consumption goods and technology. This has
resulted in a very low initial valuation of the currencies of the Eastern countries.
Both the restructuring of the physical structure of production and the upgrading of
market skills will meet barriers in the social system. Employees will resist the close
down of their production units, and managers will not voluntarily leave their
positions although other persons are better qualified. 
Also in the value system there will be barriers for the transition. This is not because
the basic culture must change in the transformation process. Such change can take
many generations. Different cultures will make different conditions for the transition
and the resulting structure of society. It is important to stress that there can be
different ypes of values attached to different social groups. This is especially the
case in the Baltic countries. This have important implications for the development
of the social system. Contradictions between differ nt ethnic or religious groups can
create social instability and be a barrier for the economic transition. At the same time
the transition can affect different groups differently and this might attenuate the
conflicts. 
The surrounding world might cause some barriers for the societies in transition.
The dissolution of CMEA and the USSR caused many links betwee  firms to be cut.
The Baltic countries were fully integrated in the specialized system of the USSR.
The break down of the Soviet system caused severe problems for many firms. But
the surrounding world also gives new possibilities to overcome some of the barriers.
The West can supply: positive influence to the democratic culture in the value
system, supervision about political and market institutions in the institutional system,
organizational exprience in the social system, transfer of know-how and capital in
the production system etc.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the main lines of interaction between the subsystems
summarized in a "good" or a "vicious" circle. The good circle appears when there
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decided by a stable majority with broad support in the population. This will result
in clear rules for the political institutions and open up for a consistent economic
policy in the area of stabilization, liberalization and privatization. If this policy is
successful it will have positive influence on the production system. An initial fall in
production will be accepted because the restructuring is apparent. This will stabilize
the situation in the social system. There will be support for the continuation of the
transition, and so on. The value system can support this process if the values are well
fit for the democrati  development. The surrounding world can support the process
if it gives sufficient supervision for the development in the social and institutional
system, if there are the necessary inflow of know how, capital and entrepreneurship
in the production system, and if the surrounding world gives access for export from
the countries in transition.
Hoewever, there is a risk of a vicious circle where the social system is very unstable
and different social groups confronts each other without any clear results. There can
be conflicts concerning the constitutional choices, where th competence of different
institutions remain unclear, and it can concern the economic transition resulting in
an unclear policy. Theeconomy might be stabilized in some fields but not in others
resulting in continuing lack of balance. Liberalization might be inconsequent so that
the agents do not expect the market mechanism to start working. The policy does not
surpass the "critical mass" to make the agents start behaving on market signals. They
do not stop hoarding goods, they do not invest in new production etc. Finally,
privatization can be blocked by conflicts about the distributional effects. Such policy
failures will also have a negative effects on the production system. This will increase
the social and the political struggle and so on. The value syst m can enforce this bad
circle by destabilizing the social system because of conflicts between differen
cultural groups, and the surrounding world can destabilize the situation by interaction
with different sides in the conflict, by restrictions on trade, by making unrealistic
expectations in the population and by holding back the needed support of know-how
and capital.
In this article I will stress both the special situation for the Baltic countries as a
group and the differences between them. The analysis starts with some background
information about the situation for the three countries before transition. I will show
how these differences to some extent can explain important differences in the
political development in the three countries and thus different paths of transition. The
balance of power between different social groups is an important factor explaining
the strategies of transition. These strategies will be explained through the main
7elements of stabilization and liberalization and even more pronounced in the
different methods of privatization in the three countries. 
2. Background conditions.
There are many parallels in the history of the three Baltic Countries. That is why
they are often taken as a group. However, there are also important differences as
well in the value system as in the other subsystems. 
The production system in the three Baltic countries is heavily influenced by 50
years under Soviet rule. That means an underdeveloped s rvice and trade sector and
an industry mainly based on very larg  firms built to supply the whole Soviet Union
with specialized goods. Compared to the other republics in the Union the Baltic
Countries, especially Estonia, have more weight on light industry (Hanson, 1990).
Both Estonia and Latvia were industrialized before the Soviet occupation. Tallinn
and especially Riga were important trade centers already in the beginning of the
century. Lithuania, on the contrary, had a large population in agriculture after the
second World War. The industry here was mainly built up under Soviet rule. In
Lithuania nd Latvia employment in agriculture were still high with 18% of the
workforce in 1990. In Estonia with 13% is still much higher than in Scandinavian
countries with around 4%.
The institutional system was integrated in the Soviet command economy. Most
economic activities were governed from the center in Moscow. Therefore, the basic
economic institutional conditions was quite similar for the whole Soviet Union.
However, the Baltic countries and especially Estonia was in the period of per stroika
used as a place for experiments with new forms of enterprises and elements of
market economy. The Baltic countries and especially Estonia had the highest density
of new cooperatives - small semi-private firms - and the highest numbers for
"individual employment" and joint-ventures (Aage, 1991). This was the f rst steps
toward a market economy.
The social system in the Baltic countries was characterized by both the dominance
of the communist nomenclatura and the dominance of Russians. In the period just
before the Soviet occupation many people emigrated to the West. During the Soviet
period many Baltic people were deported to Siberia and there was massiv
immigration of especially Russians, but also Ukrainians, Belorussians etc. The
immigrants from the rest of the Soviet Union got their jobs in new large-scale
industrial enterprises build to fit into the overall Soviet command network. In
Lithuania there were still enough surplus labor from agriculture to supply labor to the
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the rest of USSR. In Estonia and Latvia the Russian immigrants moved to the new
suburbs surrounding the big cities. They constituted about half of the industrial labor
force, and especially in Latvia they also had some of the highest positions in the
management of the enterprises. In Estonia the titular nationality had only 43% of
industrial employment, in Latvia only 38% and in Lithuania 71%. In Latvia other
nationalities had also a strong position in sectors like transport and construction, and
even in administration titular Latvians made only 56% of employment. In agriculture
the titular populations dominated in all three countries.
Figure 2.  Background conditions - before 1989.
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Production System
population (mill) 1,57 2,67 3,721
land area (1000 km) 45,1 64,6 65,22 1
NMP/cap USSR=100 (88)117 119 110
industrialization early early Soviet industrialization
Institutional System
history, foreign dominancespecially Estonia Strong state in 
During Perestroika many new cooperatives the Medieval times
centers for experiments and “individual firms”
Social System2
ethnic change during deportations of Estonians,deportations of Latvians but low immigration of 
Soviet occupation immigration of Russians immigration of Russians Russians, labor from agri-
titular nationality / total         
          1939 92% Estonians 77% Latvians 76% Lithuanians
         1945 94% 83% 80%
         1989 61% 52% 79%s
in industry 43% 38% 71%
   state farms 84% 69% 84%
   transport 67% 38% 47%
   construction 81% 46% 61%
   administration 72% 56% 78%
emigration to the West andemigration to the West andemigration of Lithuanians
to new industries to new industries culture to new industries
Value System
language Finnish/Ugrarian Baltic Baltic
religion protestant protestant catholic
foreign influence mainly german mainly german mainly polish/traditional
Surrounding world close contact with Finland  
1) EIU country profile 1992/93, 2) Hanson, 1990.
The value system is very much connected to the social system, because the social
groups are closely related to ethnic divisions. During centuries the special cultures
of the three Baltic nationalities have survived foreign occupation. They were
9independent between the two world wars, but after 1945 the Soviet occupation
challenged the Baltic cultures. The russification process did not happen only in the
form of Russian immigrants. Russian was in practice the official language and the
main language in the educational system. Therefore, there was a strong nationalist
reaction from the titular populations in all three Baltic countries. 
It is a mistake to understand the three Baltic Countries as one culture. There are
important differences of language and religion: The Estonian language is quite
similar to the Finnish language. Estonians are mainly protestants. Latvians and
Lithuanians have a specific Baltic language, but the two languages are so different
that direct communication is not possible. Latvians are mainly protestants, while
Lithuanians are mainly catholics. This difference is connected to Lithuania's historic
ties to Poland. Estonia and Latvia were more influenced by Germans (Andersen,
1992). This is also part of the explanation for the early industrialization of the two
most Northern countries. The percentage of respondents having a "positive attitude"
toward cooperative and individual activity was higher in Estonia than in the other
Baltic Countries and the rest of the former Soviet Union (Aage, 1991). These
differences reflect the fact that the Estonians had more experience with market-
orientated firms. It might also reflect a higher degree of individual values in Estonia
versus more collective and equalitarian values in Lithuania. 
The higher degree of market-orientated values in Estonia can also be connected to
influences from the surrounding world. The close linguistic relationship wit
Finland made the Estonians able to follow Finnish television and radio. Many
Estonians lived in exile in Sweden, Finland and North-America. This was to a certain
extent also the case for Latvians and Lithuanians but the language barrier implied
that the influence of Western styl  of living was smaller in these countries. This has
especially been the case in Lithuania with the most traditional agro-oriented culture.
The economic ties between the Baltic Coun ries and the West were quite small, and
in political and military matters they were completely dominated by Moscow until
the democratization period under Gorbatjov.
3. Main political developments
As illustrated in figure 1 the development in the social system and the political
changes of the institutional system are important conditions behind the economic
transition. This section gives an overview of the political development with emphasis
on the differences between the three countries. Up to the independence after th
failed August-coup in the USSR the development in the three Baltic Republics had
the same pattern, but Lithuania followed the most radical line of confrontation. This
might be explained by the more homogenous Lithuanian pulation and by the strong
role of the catholic church in Lithuania. In Estonia and Latvia there was the large
10
Russian speaking population to modify the confrontation. Estonia followed a more
pragmatic strategy, and Latvia was in a mid-position.
Figure 3. Trends in the political development. 
Balticum Estonia Latvia Lithuania
I  Fight for independence
National Popular Fronts
Communist parties split,strong pro Russian part strong independent line
1990 republic elections, pronationalists 77% pronationalists 65% pronationalists & CP 95%
independence referendumpro Russian     23% pro-Russian     30% pro-Russian                5%
Oct. 1988 Popular Front Sajudis
confrontation with Moscow
II  After independence -
    before elections
 
split of popular fronts
no citizenship and voting-no citizenship and voting introduction of citizenship 
rights to Russians,  rights to Russians, law includes minorities,
liberal economic policy, privatization only fast in good relations with Russia, 
privatization slow, agriculture (no Russians), high equalitarian values
pressure for cutting ties withgovernment-parliament in=> voucher privatization,
Russia => June 1992 intro-deadlock on citizenship weak stabilization,
duction of KROON and economic policy. IMF-pressure => stronger
shift in trade 1991-92 disputes with Russia. stabilization in autumn 92
III  After elections
more homogenous and program: ultraliberal, program: continued reform,presidential February 1993
well defined interests, focus on the West, pragmatic nationalism, center-left government,
Russian troops out election, March 1995 election, October 1995 continued IMF-pressure,
Aug 1993 in Lithuania reaction on government, reaction on establishment,problems in government, 
Aug 1994 in Estonia andnew center-government, victory for left-wing and autumn 95, banking crisis,
             Latvia slightly modified economicextreme nationalists. parlament election  Nov. 96
election, September 1992election, June 1993 early reform reaction:
center-right government center-right government parlament election  Nov. 92
hardline nationalism, often political deadlock, continuation of reforms
policy and national policy coalition, cont. deadlock conservative government.
banking crisis summer 1995,moderation on stabilization,
The majority-sections of the communist parties in all three countries changed their
policy to support more independence. Most radically this happened in Lithuania
when the local Communist Party in 1989 declared itself ind pendent from the Soviet
Communist Party. The strength of the Popular Fronts and the change in the local
communist parties resulted in a change of policy of the Baltic Supreme Soviets: In
the end of 1988 the titular languages were declared the official languages in all three
countries. They started to use their traditional flags, and in 1988-89 there was a "war
of laws" with Moscow about which legislation had the supremacy - the republican
or the all Soviet. 
The independence-movement had broad popular support. In August 1989 two mill.
people formed a 600 km human chain stretching from Tallinn to Vilnius. In the
spring of 1990 the first free elections for over 50 years took place in all three
republics. The Popular Fronts and pro-independent groups won a majority in the
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three soviets. Shortly after the election, d larations of independence were adopted.
Lithuania made the most radical declaration and this was answered by Moscow by
imposing an economic blockade. In Russia, the beginning dissolution of the Union
strengthened the conservative forces, and the tensions between Moscow and the
Baltic republics increased during the rest of 1990 culminating in January 1991 when
Soviet troops seized the Radio and Television Center killing 13 civilians. In the
spring an overwhelming majority v ted for independence in referendums in Estonia
and Lithuania. In Estonia around 50% of the non-estonian speaking people also
voted for independence (Andersen, 1992).
After the failed coup the Baltic Countries were r cognized as independent states not
only by Western countries, but also by the other States of the former Soviet Union.
When the chains to USSR were removed, there was more room for differences in the
economic and political development in the three countries: 
Since the election in 1990 the new government in Estonia were dominated by
experts working for Estonian independence. Many leading officials had a past in the
communist party. They were working for a gradual but comprehensive economic
transition, and they followed a quite soft l n  in the confrontation with the Russians.
Although the economic reforms with price liberalization and partial indexation of
wages meant hardship for the population, the g vernment was not met by resistance
from the public or the parliament in 1990 and 1991. It was quite clear that the
government, until the independence in 1991, had limited room for their decisions,
and in many respects the Estonian ecomy was developing quite well compared to
other Soviet republics. The price reforms meant high inflation but also more goods
in the shops and improvements in the terms of trade with Russia. However, when
Russia liberalized prices in January 1992 and adjusted the prices of exported raw
material to the world market level this meant a severe shock for the Baltic
economies. The result was hyperinflation for the fi st months in 1992, and a sharp
reduction of supply of energy and other essential raw materials.
The government was changed i  early 1992, but the new government continued the
economic policy, culminating with the introduction of the KROON in June 1992.
The new government followed a more nationalistic line. The 1938-citizenship law
was reinstated. Citizenship was only given to citizens from before 1940 and their
descendants. For later immigrants it was rather difficult to get citizenship. This
meant that the Russian minority had no voting rights at the referendum in June 1992,
when the new constitution was approved, and no voting rights at the parliamen
election in September 1992. At this election the national question still had a high
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priority. The nationalist parties won, and a center-right gov nment was formed. The
economic policy was neo-liberalistic leaving little scope for the role of the state and
the tough economic policy was continued. The "aliens law" passed by parliament in
June 1993 escalated the conflict with the Russian speaking minority. There were
protests both from East and West, and the president denied to underwrite the first
draft of the law. After some adjustment giving the Russian speaking population right
to stay in Estonia it was passed (Andersen, 1994). The law considered the Russian
speaking minority to be foreigners, and gave them only limited rights. Thus, the
national question dominated the political scene giving the government greater scope
in the economic policy. However, the government's popularity continued to fall and
was met by increasing apathy by the titular Estonians while the Russian speaking
people were more active. At the local elections in October 1993 where most of the
Russian speaking population had the right to vote, parties supported by Russians got
relatively high votes and an influential position both in the North Eastern part of
Estonian and in the Tallinn area. In September the primeminister had to step down
in favor of a caretaker government for the period up to the election in March 1995.
This election can be interpreted as a r action toward the tough economic policy and
its consequences for broad s cial groups in the population. The winners had some
relations back to the Estonian communist party, but they were also leading figures
in the first years fter the Estonian independence. Their party can more correctly be
described as a center party. However, in relation to the former right-wing dominated
parliament the election was in fact a turn toward the left. A center coalition made up
the government. In the summer of 1995 an Estonian "Watergate" scandal was the
cause for a change in government in favor a the more liberal (right wing) Reform
party. This party was headed by the president of the Central Bank, one of the
architects behind the liberal economic reforms. In the national policy the government
followed a more pragmatic line. The troop withdrawal treaty hich was signed back
in July 1994 and mainly implemented with the withdrawal of nearly all Russian
troops in August 1994 was finally ratified by the parliament in December 1995.
Estonias application for EU was formally submitted in November. This turned out
to be the main path for Estonian integration with Western Europe.
The political development in Latvia had many parallels to the development in
Estonia. However, the Latvians met more obstacles: Latvia and especially Riga was
the stronghold of the Soviet troops, the Russians had a stronger position at the
management level of the industrial enterprises (EIU,2:93), and Latvia had not so
close links to the West as did Estonia in relation to Finland. 
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After the el ction in 1990 a government was formed based on the Popular Front.
This government had increasing troubles to get a majority behind its policy, because
the Popular Front was split on how to solve the problem of citizenship and on
economic policy. Citizenship was restored for people living in Latvia before 1940
and their descendants. This covered 72% of the population including about20% non-
titular Latvians. The question about possible citizenship for the big group of
postwar-immigrants wa  postponed to after the election which was postponed until
June 1993 because of a political deadlock. 
The first election after independence was like in Estonia a victory for the nationalist
center-right. The leading party in government became "Latvian Way" with 36% of
the parliament seats. They wanted a quota-system for integration of the Russians in
the Latvian society. Their coalition partner, the Peasant's Union, got 12% of the
seats. The government gave a high priority to closer integration with the West and
fast privatization, but at the same time the Peasant's Union wanted import-control on
food (EIU, 2:93). The national question continued to have a high priority on the
political agenda. The debate on citizenship continued for months after the election.
In the spring of 1994 a proposal was passed which would set very restrictive quotas.
However, the international community protested and the Latvian president vetoed
the law. In July, a new law without strict quotas were passed. This law gave
residents born in Latvia possibility to appl  f r citizenship, but the administration of
the law was quite restrictive. An Association agreement with EU was finally settled
in July 1995.
The second parliamentary election after full independence took place on October
1995. The leading party in the Latvian government, Latvian Way, had after a low
period gained back some of its support, but were then weakened because of the
bank-crisis which swept the country from the spring of 1995. The crisis at the same
time put extra pressure on the state budget. Massive spending cuts meant very bad
relations between government and growing numbers of public-sector workers, such
as the increasingly militant teachers. They went on strike in December 1994, and
after a week the government gave in to their wage demands (EIU,95:1).
The banking crisis had a big effect on the results of the election in September 1995.
The government party Latvian Way lost more than half of their 36 seats but they
were still with 17 seats the second largest party in the Latvian parliament with a total
of 100 seats. The election was like in Estonia a reaction toward the results of the
reform process. The election marked a move to the left. But also extreme nationalist
parties had a surprisingly large support. The new parliament showed in this specter
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a left-right divide with nearly equal halfs and a strong divide according to the
relations to the Russian minority. The political deadlock became an even more
strong element in Latvian politics and it took months of negotiati ns to form the new
government. At the end of December 1995 an unusual coalition of 6 parties
representing 68 seats was formed. The coalition consisted of both left and right-wing
parties and pragmatic and hard core Latvian nationalists. The formation of the
government was based on allocation of ministries more than on compromises on
policies. However, the coalition parties agreed about their commitments to
membership of EU and NATO and increased Baltic cooperation. 
In Lithuania the citizenship question was not so important because the titular
population made a comfortable m jority. The citizenship legislation was quite strict
in the demands for residency etc. but a flexible introduction gave the possibility for
most of the non-titular minority t  be citizens. Although Lithuania had the strongest
conflicts with Moscow it was possible for Landsbergis to sign an agreement for
withdrawal of Russian troops to be finished by August 1993. Therefore, the national
question had a relatively little role in the political debate. 
The Democratic Labor Party with roots in the former communist party was quite
popular contrary to the case in the other Baltic Countries. The Lithuanian communist
had followed a quite nationalistic line in contradiction to Moscow already from
1989, so the party and its leader, Brazauskas, was not identified with Soviet
suppression as it was the case in Estonia and Latvia. The period of Soviet rule was
not considered an economic disaster to the same extent as in the other more
developed Baltic countries. There was no threat from a big Russian minority with
close links to the communist party. The early market reforms in Lithuania was a
failure especially in the countryside, and the economic disaster was being linked to
the policy of Sajudis. Therefore, the Labor Party had a victory at the election in
October/November 1992, and because of the system of half of the candidates el cted
in constituencies the Labor Party won an absolute majority in the Lithuanian
parliament. At the presidential election Brazauskas won 60% of the votes. Especially
in the countryside and among the non-titular Lithuanians the labor party won its
support. Thus, the introduction of citizenship to all residents of Lithua ia contributed
to the victory of the former communists.
The victory of the Labor Party did not signal a radical shift in economic policy.
Lithuania started already in 1991 a fast privatization program based on a voucher
system. This system signalled a commitment to turn away from state ownership, and
at the same time it favored a rather equal distribution of wealth. The stabilization
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policy was quite weak in 1991 and 1992. This can partly be explained by the chaotic
leadership of the ruling conservative coalition and partly by the fact that there was
not a nationalistic shield over the economic policy. The eople to be hit by the tough
incomes policy made a big part of the voters. In Estonia and Latvia a big proportion
of the workers belonged to the minority without voting rights. The lower priority to
nationalism was also one of the explanations behind the relatively slow introduction
and stabilization of an independent Lithuanian currency. However, especially
pressure from IMF resulted in more tough stabilization policy from the autumn of
1992, and this policy was continued by the labor government. Although the labor
party had a comfortable majority in parliament the government was not so stable.
There were several shifts of ministers. The opposition was constantly attacking the
government for corruption. 
Brazauskas kept his quite high popularity in Lithuania and in spite of  scandals
among his minister there was for a long period a relatively stable political situation
in Lithuania compared to its Northern neighbors. However, the government gradually
lost its popularity partly because of the low living standards and because of the
continuing corruption charges raised against the government from the opposition. A
banking crisis in the end of 1995 and the forced resignation of the prime minister in
early 1996 weakened the Labour Party further and at the parlamentary election in
November 1996 the conservative party won the majority. Also in Lithuania there
was a reaction from the population because of disappointment of the results of
transition. The economic policy followed also in Lithuania the tough model used in
the other Baltic countries. In all three countries we have seen popular reactions
against he government, no matter whether they declared themselves to be left or
right wing.
4. Stabilization and liberalization.
The transition to a market economy already started in the end of the 80's in the Baltic
Countries. The fight for independence was closely connected to the objective of
transforming the command economy. Economic independence meant that the
administrative control from Moscow was abolished. The Baltic Republics wanted
to manage their economies themselves. Th  idea of decentralization lead to the idea
of a market orientated economy.  
These ideas were first developed in a comprehensive way in the Eston an"IME"
plan from May 1989. It was an outline for an independent Estonian economy with
its own currency, central bank and a mixed ownership structure consisting of public
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firms, private joint stock companies and private employee-owned firms. Duri g 1989
some of the "plans" i the program were approved in the legislation, and one of the
leading authors of the program were appointed the first chairman of the new Bank
of Estonia. Also in implementing Gorbatjov's Perestroika Estonia was in the front
line. The Baltic countries, and especially Estonia, had in the end of the 80's the
biggest proportion of employment in private firms in the form of "cooperatives" and
"individual enterprises",  (Hanson, 1990). In 1990 Estonia was in front ith Western
investment. It had nearly as many joint ventures as did the much larger Russia
(World Bank, 1992)
From January 1991, Estonia had its own state budget. This meant initially that the
net transfers to the Soviet budget was cut away, and Estonia like Latvia and
Lithuania had a substantial surplus on the budget (Saavalainen 1995) Already from
1991 many important elements in the new tax-system were implemented. The fiscal
policy was rather strict. The currency board meant that the state could not finance
a deficit by "printing money". Financing by selling state bonds was not feasible in
the first years of transition. This became possible later in the process, but shifting
Estonian governments have kept the discipline so there were balanced budgets up
to 1995 and the budget approved for 1996 also follows the strict line (EIU,96:1).
From January 1994 the tax system was simplified and included less redistribution
since the progressive tax system varying from 16 to 33% was changed to a flat rate
of 26% for all incomes (EIU, 1:94). This was an example of the right-wing policy
followed in this period also including very low minimum-wage, pensions and other
social benefits.
Monetary policy had only limited scope when Estonia were still in the Rubel-zone,
but during 1991 the int rest rate was gradually increased to match inflation. Before
that time the real interest rate had been strongly negative. In June 1992 Estonia
introduced its own currency the KROON. Following the "currency board" principle
the amount of KROONs was strictly tied to the Estonian reserves of hard currency
and gold. The exchange rate of 8 EEK = 1 DM has been fixed since 1992. The other
side of the coin is a limited supply of money and a very tight credit policy. There is
no room to expand the amount of money to stimulate investment. The central bank
cannot control credits and it cannot make open market operations. The interest rate
is set at the market outside the control of the central bank (Bennett, 1993, Lainela
& Sutela, 1993). The KROON was made internally convertible, but there were still
strong restrictions on capital movements. 
Most of the liberalization of prices took place from the second half of 1990 to the
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beginning of 1992. In 1990 much of the subsidies on food were cut down. Prices
increased 2-300% ( 1993). In 1991 further liberalization took place for a broad range
of goods. In 1991 inflation in general was more than 200%. The biggest inflationary
push came in the first months of 1992 following the liberalization of p ices in Russia.
Prices on raw materials imported from Russia were adjusted toward the level on the
world market. However, after the introduction of the KROON in the summer of 1992
inflation per month fell to single digit numbers, and in April 1993 it was down at
2,3%. For 1993 as a whole inflation was 90%, but with a falling trend. In the
beginning of 1994 there was increased inflationary pressure because of rising prices
on energy, rent and public transport. Regulations in these administrated prices was
also the main explanation behind the inflationary pressure in 1995. Also, the
government's continuing shift towards taxing consumption had resulted in some
inflationary pressure. In the autumn of 1995 excise duty on petrol and diesel was
increased by 200% and also higher duties on alcohol came into effect. High foreign
capital inflow because of the curren y board resulted in an increase in the supply of
KROONs. Therefore, the objectives for inflation in 1994 and 1995 were not fulfilled.
Average inflation for 1995 was 29% with a sligthly falling tendency, see figure 4.
Figure 7. Economic results in the three Baltic countries.
          Estonia           Latvia           Lithuania
                              1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1990 1991 1992199319941995
GDP growth %1   -8  -11  -14   -9    -3    3   -3   -8  -35  -16    1   -2   -5  -13  -38  -24    1    3
unemployment average2    0    0      4  4.1  4.0    0    0   1.2   5.2  6.2  6.6    0    0     4.4   3.8   6.1
inflation (CPI)1   23  211 1076   90   48  29   11  224  951  109   36   25    8  225 1021 410  72  40
average wage $ Dec3   16   65   77 178 272   12   52  118 188 213   10   27   70 115 167
budget balance %  GDP1   2.9  5.2  -0.3  -0.7  1.3 -0.8   2   6.4  -0.8  0.6    -4.0 -3.3   -5.4  2.7  0.8 -3.1  -4.2 -3.3
foreign investment m $1   58  162  214 204   43   51  155    10  23   60   55
1) EBRD, 2) National Statistics, 3) Based on The Baltic Independent.
The development of the banking sector  played an important role in the development
in Estonia. The first commercial bank was established in 1988. By mid 1991 there
were 12 commercial banks in Estonia. In 1992 the number had grown to 43. Many
of these banks were in a difficult financial situation. During 1992 the Bank of
Estonia strengthened the reserve requirements and in November three of the biggest
banks were put under administration. The crisis resulted in mergers and
bankruptcies. The number of banks in the spring of 1993 fell to only 23. However,
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in this way Estonia succeeded in developing a relatively sound banking sector at a
quite early stage of transition. The development in Estonia shows the determination
of the authorities to strengthen the co ditions not only of the banking sector, but for
all firms. A change from a regime of "soft" to a regime of "hard" budget constraint.
If the banks themselves have a hard budget constraint they will pass this constraint
to their debtor firms. In 1993 Estonia implemented a rather strict bankruptcy law
giving quite strong possibilities for creditors to start bankruptcy procedures. In the
summer of 1994 26 industrial enterprises had been declared in bankruptcy and by
mid 1995 around 1000 enterprises had been through bankruptcy procedures.
Bankruptcy have been implemented more rigorously in Estonia than in nearly all
other countries in transition (EBRD 1996). The development of a securities market
had not a high priority in Estonia. With no budget deficits to finance there was no
no need to issue Treasury bills. However, the voucher privatization with large public
offerings in the autumn of 1995 created a need for an equity market which was
established in 1996. 
The liberalization of foreign trade h s been quite fast and comprehensive. In 1993
nearly all goods could be freely imported and exported. On December 1991 Estonian
made a free trade agreement with EFTA on industrial goods and on May 1992 an
agreement with EC liberalizing trade with most industrial goods. In the summer of
1994 a free trade agreement was concluded with EU for all the Baltic Countries and
in the summer of 1995 association agreements - "Europe agreements" - were signed.
Different from the case in Latvia and Lithuania the Estonian free trade for industrial
goods could start without an adjustment period because Estonia from the beginning
had a very liberal trade regime.
The disintegration of the Former Soviet Union and the opening up for trade with
Western countries have resulted in a remarkable switch in foreign trade. In the
1980'es Estonia's trade with Western countries were negligible. Already in 1992
Finland was the most important trading partner and in 1995 it counted for 31% of
total trade (EIU, 96:1). The KROON and the fast liberalization process were the
main factors behind this remarkable switch. But the switch to Western trading
partners was also a strong objective in the eco omic policy. This can be seen: in the
exchange rate policy; in the fact that foreigners were allowed to buy Estonian land
connected to production units already in April 1993; and in the privatization policy
emphasizing foreign investments, see section 5.
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Figure 5. Overview over stabilization and liberalization - 1990-95 
STABILIZATION Estonia Latvia Lithuania
fiscal policy tight policy, high discipline, 1991, Latvian budget (balance),92 cuts in taxes and expenditures,
restricted by currency board. autumn 1992, tight policy 1993 moderately tight policy,
monetary-policy in 1992 positive real interest, from 1992 tight money policy quite loose 1991-92
Central Bank no interference very high interest rates, tight from spring 1993
due to currency board, end 1993, treasury bills issue,
exchange rate-policyKROON from June 1992 July 92 independent floating LVRMay 1992, start issuing Talonas
currency board, fixed to DM appreciates to Rubles,later to USDJune 1993, Litas legal tender
then real terms appreciation from 94 quite fixed to SDR 1994 currency board, 4Lit=1USD
price liberalization spring 1990, start liberalizationJan. 1991, start liberalization Jan. 1991, start liberalization
1991, further lib. also wholesale Dec. 1991, free prices on foodOctober 1992, 15% controlled
1992, fuel,transport, rent not freeJan. 1992, on industrial goods (energy, transport, tele, housing)
1994, nearly completed, 1992 public utilities, rent not free1994 stop for remaining subsidies
bank system Dec. 1988, first semiprivate bankBy 1994, 64 commercial banks,Start of capital market with
1992/93 strict control => 1995 largest bank bankrupt, Investment Funds (vouchers)
commercial banks 43 -> 20 July 95, stock exchange reopens.Sept. 1993 start stock exchange
foreign trade
agreements with July 1992: free trade with from license to tax on export, July 1993, tariffs 10-30%
EFTA Dec 91,full 95Norway, Sweden and Finland. Sept. 1993, 15-30% tariffs, July 1994, higher tariffs on food,
EU May 92,July 95 Jan. 1995, free trade with EU. 4 years EU adjustment period,6 years EU adjustment period,
liberal trade regime from 1992Jan. 1992 deregulation import,1992, import quite liberal,
foreign investment Sept. 1991, amended Dec. 1993,Nov. 1991, amended March 1993,December 1990, legislation
law on foreign investment, law on foreign investment, February and June 1992, 
few restrictions, tax benefits tax benefits, phased out 1995,further liberalization,
The Latvian economic transition has similarities with the development in Estonia,
but slower and not so successful in switching towards Western markets. Like in
Estonia, Latvia got quite high financial autonomy from 1991, when a new tax system
was introduced including, tax on property, land and profits, progress ve incomes tax,
social security paid on payroll, and a turnover tax, from January 1992 transformed
to a VAT. Like in Estonia the state budget in Latvia had a consider ble surplus in
1991, but the situation turned around because of a deteriorating taxbase in 1992 after
the negative development in the terms of trade with the increase in Russian prices.
After pressure from IMF the finance-policy was strengthened. The stabilization
program for July 1992 to July 1993 included elimination of all subsidies on
consumer goods, reduction of subsidies for agriculture, cuts in employment in the
public sector and a 15% tariff on imports (WB 1993). After the election in 1993 it
became clear that the budget deficit was increasing. As a response the VAT was
increased. In 1994 the government just succeeded to keep the budget deficit within
the 2% prescribed by IMF. In 1995 a tough budget was approved but strikes among
the public workers resulted in higher wage increases than budgeted. With the tax
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arrears still increasing the budget came under increasing pressure. 
Because of the deadlock in Latvian politics, the stabilization policies of the
government were not so consequently implemented in Latvia as in Estonia.
Therefore, the monetary policy played a more important role. A more active
monetary policy was also both needed and possible because Latvia later chose a
regime with floating exchange rates. The bank of Latvia followed a line even more
tight than the policy in Estonia. Interest rates were held quite high. The Latvian
Rubles were introduced in May 1991 as a parallel currency to the Russian Ruble. In
July the Latvian Rubles (LVR) were declared sole legal tender. From the same time
LVR were made internally convertible and the exchange rate were floating also
against Rubles (Bleskina, 1993).
Because of the continuing high inflation LVR depreciated against hard currencies in
the following months, but it appreciated strongly against the Russian Rubles. From
the winter of 1992/93 LVR also appreciated against DM and USD. Inflation in
Latvia fell to only 0,3% in April 1993 (Shteinbuka 1993). In March 1993 LVR
started to be phased out by "Lats" for the exchange rate of 1 Lat = 200 LVR, and in
July 1993, Lats were declared full legal tender. The introductio  of Latvian currency
was more gradual than it was the case in Estonia, and in this way it was easier to
continue trade relations with former partners in Russia, Ukraine etc. (Bleskina,
1993). Latvia liberalized restrictions on convertibility faster than Estonia. Riga
became one of the main centers for currency trade in the whole former Soviet Union
(Lainela & Sutela 1993). 
The price liberalization in Latvia was a little behind the development in Estonia. In
December 1991 the liberalization of farm procurement and retail food prices were
completed. In January 1992 prices on industrial goods were liberalized, so the main
prices still regulated were for public utilities and rent. By 1995 electric tariffs
charged by the state owned utility covered only around 60% of the cost. Adjustment
to the market level were not envisaged before 2005 (EBRD 1996). The bankruptcy
law was not effectively implemented. 
The growth of the financial sector in Latvia took off in 1992 when the financial ties
with Russia were broken and the new banking legislation were implemented. The
new commercial banks were in the start quite small and many of them were mainly
servicing their owners, large state owned enterprises. However, in spite of the
economic depression in the rest of the economy the banks developed quite rapidly
and increased their reserves. In 1993 the capital of commercial banks increased four-
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fold. At the end of 1993 61 commercial banks were registered (Baltic Independent
15-4-1994). The banking crisis in 1995 followed after international auditing had
revealed the critical situation of many of the banks. Only 15 banks had been
profitable in 1994. First of all it was uncovered that the largest bank, Baltija, was in
a critical situation. Baltija had around one fifth of the Latvian population as
depositors. The government tried to rescue the bank, but after some month it was
finally declared bankrupt in December 1995. The state covered personal depositors
for up to 200 Lats. The collapse spread shock waves all around the Latvian
economy, to the state budget, to other banks and enterprises, to the general consum r
so the effect was a strong dampening of the economic recovery.
Foreign trade was gradually liberalized. In the beginning of 1992, all controls on
imports were taken away. All export quotas and licensing were abolish d on June
1992 and replaced with a system of export taxes. (IMF-Survey, Nov 1992). A
general 15% import tariff on finished goods was introduced in 1993. Custom duties
on food have been increased to around 50% to support agriculture. Like for Estonia
free trade agreements have been settled with EU, EFTA and the other Baltic
countries. The free trade according to the "Europe agreement" from the summer of
1995 had a four year adjustment period.
Some of the general trends from Estonia and Latvia can also be found in the
economic development in Lithuania. This is because of the common conditions in
relation to the surrounding world. Price liberalization in Lithuania in 1991 and the
liberalization in Russia in 1992 and especially the increase in energy prices gave in
Lithuania the same terms of trade effects that has already been shown for Estonia
and Latvia. Terms of trade improved in 1991 and worsened sharply in 1992. Steeply
falling foreign trade with the former Soviet Union and falli g production belong also
to the common picture. Also in Lithuania the conditions set by IMF gave a
strengthening of the stabilization policy in the second half of 1992. The special
feature of Lithuania was a quite weak stabilization policy with delayed stabilization
of wages and money-policy compared to th  other two Baltic States. Hyperinflation
continued well into 1993.
Fiscal policy and introduction of a new tax system was similar to the other Baltic
republics. The Lithuanian government also succeeded in having a surplus on the
budget in 1992 because of tough expenditure cuts (WB 1993). The tax system was
quite similar to the Latvian system, but it took longer time to make a more efficient
tax-collection system in Lithuania. The tax revenue in relation to GDP was 8-10
percentpoint lower in Lithuania in 1993 and 1994 than it was in Estonia and Latvia
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(Saavalainen, 1995). Tax collection improved in 1995 so the pressure on the state
budget was released to a certain extent.  
Unlike the other Baltic Countries real wages were not cut in 1991. First after IMF-
pressure real wages were cut in the second half of 1992. The target was a fall around
30-35%, but according to the World Bank (Lit-1993) the fall was even steeper. This
was bad timing for the Landsbergis government. The election was held at a time with
sharply falling real wages and with inflation still out of control. The new government
promised both to stop inflation and to improve real wages. In the spring of 1993
wages were increased nearly to follow the inflation.
The main stabilizing element came from a change in the monetary-policy in the
summer of 1993. Lithuania stayed in the Ruble zone a few months longer than the
other Baltic Countries. In May 1992 it introduced its parallel currency, "Talonas",
to cover the deficit on Russian rubles. On October the Talonas were declared "sole
legal tender" with a floating exchange rate toward other currencies. In the first
months the Talonas followed the depreciation of the Russian rubles. This can b
explained by the relatively weak stabilization policy up to the end of 1992. The
monetary policy was quite loose. The central bank gave cheap credits to the firms
without enough security. In the Spring of 1993 a new chairman of the Bank of
Lithuania was appointed, and the government was committed to stabilize the
currency before the introduction of the ew Lithuanian currency the "Litas". Credits
to firms were cut down and reserve requirements were increased.The inflation was
halved every month from 25% in April 1993 to 3% in July. The Litas wer
introduced on June 25 and made sole legal tender. From April 1994 Lithuania
introduced a currency board linking the Litas to the dollar. The background was not
so clear as in the earlier Estonian case since at this point the Litas had a quite high
credibility and was relatively stable. However, it was a signal to the surrounding
world of commitment to a tough stabilization policy. 
Price liberalization started in February 1991, and by October 1992 only 15% of
prices were controlled. This included housing, energy, telecommunication and public
transport. In September 1992 a bankruptcy law was introduced but real enforcement
was not in place before in 1996 (EBRD 1996). In July 1993, 10-30% tariffs on
imports substituted the earlier licensing system. In July 1994, tariffs were increased
on food products. In the association agreement with EU from June 1995 Lithuania
got a 6 years period for reducing the tariffs. 
The development of the banking system was quite similar to the other Baltic
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countries although a little slower. Not so many new banks were established
In 1995 Lithuania had 19 banks of which 3 ere majority owned by the state. Since
1993 6 banks had lost their licenses. Early 1995 the central bank introduced stricter
loan provisions and reserve requirements. In September th  eighth largest bank were
suspende. Operations of two of the largest banks Innovation bank and Litimpex
bank were suspended in December 1995 starting a banking crisis with many parallels
to the Latvian case. The waves from the financial sector spread and dampened the
whole economy. In September 1993 the first Baltic stock exchange opened in
Vilnius mainly based on shares in privatized companies. 
5. Privatization
In all economies in transition privatization  turned out to be the  structural reform
that caused most problems and takes most time. There are many different methods
of privatization and each method means a specific set of opportunities for different
social groups in the society. The choice of privatization path is a fundamental
political choice reflecting the actual distribution of power and determining the future
distribution. To understand the political background also the national dimension must
be included. This is especially the case for understanding the different privatization
paths in the three Baltic Countries, and it is connected to the fact that the Russian
speaking minority is much more i portant in the two countries to the North. The p-
olicy changed as the relation to USSR and later Russia changed. Privatization was
in Estonia and Latvia closely related to the fight for independence and for increasing
the titular population's control of productive resources.
This relation seems to be most clear in Estonia. In the period when Estonia was still
dependent on Moscow's goodwill and on the whole population living in Estonia the
strategy for privatization was to transfer ownership from the USSR to Estonia. The
workers were good allies in this process, and at the same time the claims for market
economy were not so radical. Therefore, employee-ownership in the form of
"peoples enterprises" played an important role in the IME program from 1989. The
idea of "peoples enterprises" "was seen as an intermediary step between all-union
and republican subordination, and was designed to make the desired transfer of
control ess threatening to Moscow and the current directors" (IMF-Survey, 1991
p.234). In "peoples enterprises" the work-collective leased the enterprise, so the
workers had an important role in the first privatization. However, only seven  large
enterprises became "peoples enterprises" (Elenurm et.al.,1993). 
Figure 6.  Overview over privatization, 1989-95.
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Estonia Latvia Lithuania
wild privatization "experiments" from 1987 Institutional control unclear, high speed of privatization
SOE-subsidiaries from 1989 high autonomy for managers, can give lack of control 
reprivatization Dec. 1990 law: deadline: land - June 1991 only "immoveable" property,
April 1992 200000 claims firms - July 1992 deadline for claims Jan 1992,
February 1994 100000 validated,for housing - October 1994, no trade of land for 5 years,
compensation vouchers, compensation vouchers, 
small privatization Dec 1990 law, amended May 92law Nov. 1991, municipalities, vouchers and cash quotas can be
Oct. 1991 only 95 (IMF) below 10 employees, auction used in auctions,
April 1993, 50% privatized trade, catering, service
1993 sold 243, 125 mill EEK, 85% privatized 1994       1992  1993  1994  1995
1994, sold 1500, nearly all, some to employees. sold  57%  70%  76%  100%
large privatization 1989 IME: Peoples enterprises1991, 6 SOE sold to employees,1991, LIPSP privatization law,
1991: 7 SOE experiments sale decentralized to ministries,ale of shares through 
1992: THA-model April 93, 20 SOEs sold/leased, vouchers and cash quotas,
 mill EEK   1993   1994   1995 Jan. 1994, 46 SOEs sold/leased,the share employees can buy at
enterprises      88     207     142 1994, ca. 150 SOE sold/leased,preferential terms increased
salesprice      340   1277     937March 1994, new law, 1991:10%,1992:30%,1993:50
1000 job guar.   9      25       17 centralization of authority at %       1992  1993  1994  1995
investment     220    808   1003Latvian Privatization Agency sold    38%   62%  75%   99%
Public auction of minority sharesNov. 94 1st international tenderof LIPSP 2926 enterprises,
for vouchers 1995 start sale for voucher/cash tenders of min. shares utilities,
started autumn 1994, Aug. 1994 start voucher market,46 SOE hard currency sale,
banks most commercial banks Bank of Latvia's commercial 20 private commercial banks  
started as private, branches merged in Unibank 93some with min. state shares
state sells out 1994-96 privatized 1995-96 3 state commercial banks,
land/property
/housing
April 1993 law, vouchers for eachrestitution 40% 1995 restitution or
year worked in Estonia, main part to be sold for sold for vouchers and cash
payment per squaremeter, vouchers: 1/2 m2 = 1 voucher, Dec 92, 89% private, finish 93
July 94, 10.000 out of 460.000slow process 1995-1999 1994 large real estate market,
agriculture 1991, law on land-reform start in 1989, restitution 1989 law on land rights,
quite slow privatization Nov. 90,land reform, usufructususufructus to 
mainly through restitution, June 1991, Property reform 6000 former owners.
only 10.000 private farms 1993collectives and state farms -> jointJuly 1991 Land law, restitution
June 1993, preferential rights toployees and former owners, Sept 1992, 500000 applicants 
farmer-coops for food industry1993, 2/3 land private, 57500ult 1993 only 1/5 settled
stock companies, shares to em-compensation also possible,
mainly through restitution green vouchers to farmers,
foreign investment Sept 91: foreign investment lawDec. 1994 foreigners can own only Lithuanians can own
April 93 foreigners can buy landland with production facilities, foreigner 99 years lease,
but not trade it, tax benefits tax benefits, open for the West, 1996,
new firms rapid development, not widespread in industry, but innot widespread in industry, but
barrier: lack of finance, trade, construction, services, mostin trade, construction, services,
10.000 upstarts in 1993 (ME) non-Latvian entrepreneurs.
Most of the workers were not titular Estonians, and at the same time the workers'
union was losing its legitimacy, so the policy soon changed giving less influence to
employees. In October 1990 it was made possible to sell up to 20% of the shares to
the employees by preferential conditions (Terk, 1993), but privatization should
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mainly be based on direct sale with voucher systems in a secondary role. In this way
the interests of the workers were phased down in a quite early stage when the
independence movement started to get some momentum. An exemption from this
trend was the privatization of another seven large enterprises in 1991 on an
experimental basis. In some of these enterpris s the employees got a majority of the
ownership, but the shares were often divided in non-voting shares for the majority
of employees and voting shares for management.
The legislation for "small privatization" was passed in December 1990. Firms with
less than 500.000 Rb in book value could be privatized for cash. There were special
preemptive rights for employees giving them the first option to buy. The law was
amended in May 1992, and the special rights of insiders were abandoned. There
was, however, a fear among dominant Estonian parties, that direct sale of 
assets could attract big amounts of Rubles from all over the former Soviet Union.
Therefore, privatization was quite slow in this stage. In January 1992 only 208 units
had been sold (Frydman et. al. 1993). Privatization did not take off before the
introduction of the KROON in June 1992. The KROON functioned as a shield
against a massive inflow of Rubles, and gave Estonian citizens a stronger position.
During the rest of 1992 and in 1993 the small privatization accelerated and at the en
of 1994 nearly all of 1500 small enterprises had been privatized (Baltic Independent,
Jan. 13, 1995).
The Estonian governments followed a strong West-orientated policy also in relation
to privatization. The government supported sale for cash and wanted foreign capital
to play an important role in the process. The majority in parliament initialy wanted
stronger emphasis on vouchers also for large privatization. In the summer of 1992
the climate toward sale of enterprises for cash changed because of the successful
introduction of the Estonian KROON. The government developed a new scheme for
sale of enterprises inspired by the method used by Treuhandanstalt in Germany, and
the parliament passed resolutions supporting this scheme just before the election in
September 1992. The parties behind the new government decided to continue the
new policy of privatization. The first tender for a group of enterprises were made in
November 1992. The bids were not only chosen on the criteria of the highest price,
also investment plans and job-guarantees were given considerable attention. In 1993
the process of privatization gained momentum. The government continued the
Treuhand-strategy with 4-5 tenders a year, with the total number of announced
enterprises around 500 and covering 120,000 employees. The actual settlement of
contracts also gained speed in the end of 1993 and in 1994. Then it began to fall in
1995 because there was not much more to privatize (EIU, 95:4). The shift of
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government in 1995 did not mean any essential change in privatization policy. The
speed of sales were impressing but not the selling prices and the guarantees. Most
of the enterprises were sold without debt. Thus the net revenue for EPA was often
negative (WB 1994). This is similar to the results of Treuhandanstalt which ended
up with a negative balance. Of the first tender the enterprises sold as whole units had
employment guarantees varying from 17%-120%. For the total sold at the end of
1995 the job guarantees were less than half of the employment at the time of
privatization. 
The director of EPA estimated that 20% of the privatized capital were sold to
foreigners, and if the foreign capital behind some Estonian buyers were included the
percentage would increase to about 40% (Baltic Independent 29-4-1994).
Although vouchers had been discussed as a possibility, and the idea had quite strong
support in the parliament in the early stage of transition the government succeeded
in giving voucher systems a limited role. In April 1993 a law was passed that entitled
residents over the age of 18 to vouchers in proportion to the number of years they
had worked in Estonia. These vouchers should mainly be used for the purchase of
their apartments. The distribution of vouchers in relation to working years meant that
immigrants got less than e typical titular Estonian. Young citizens got a minimum
of vouchers higher than if they had got vouchers only based on their working years.
However, this was not the case for the main part of young people from the Russian
speaking minority (Andersen 1996). The vouchers were mainly supposed to be used
for privatizing housing, but in 1994 the idea about selling minority shareholdings of
large enterprises for vouchers was supported by parliament. Vouchers were
distributed from May 1994. By December 1995 approximately 480,000 voucher-
account with a nominal value of around 8,5 billion EEK were opened in the banks
(Kein, 1995). The vouchers could substitute cash in nearly all types of privatization.
The main use of vouchers for enterprise privatization was in the large privatization
with public offerings of which the first took place in the winter 1994-95. It was only
minority shares offered for sale for the public - from 20% to 49% of the shares.
Before the offering the dominating part of the shares had been taken over by a core-
owner.
The nationalistic orientatd parties in parliament emphasized restitution of property
nationalized after the Soviet occupation. In June 1991, legislation about restitution
was passed. First priority was to give back the assets to the former owners or their
descendants. If this was not possible they got the special compensation-vouchers.
Restitution was especially important in agriculture. Before the Second World War
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Estonia had 140.000 private farms (EIU, 2:93). Because of complete dominance of
titular Estonians in this sector there was no national problem, but the complications
concerning restitution delayed the proecess. According to the Ministry of Economics
(1994) instead of 360 collective farms there was in November 1993 4313 private
farms, 1218 share holding farms and 769 cooperative farms. Only 1700 farming
properties had been returned to former owners, because of the problems of
restitution.
In Latvia the national question also played a major role for privatization but large
privatization was more slow and hesitant than in Estonia. It was not speeded up
before 1994 and 1995 and higher priority was given to vouchers. However,
privatization of agriculture was quite fast and foreign investment play a smaller role
compared to Estonia. Although the political landscape of Latvia has many
similarities with the situation in Estonia, there are differences that gives some
understanding of the different paths ofrivatization. More than half of the industrial
workers in Latvia have Russian as their main language like in Estonia, but unlike
Estonia a dominant part of the industrial managers and most of the new private
capitalists are non-titular Latvians. This can be an important explanation behind the
higher priority given to vouchers in Latvia. The voucher system was de igned so that
the immigrants after 1945 get a relatively little share.
On the other hand, it could be expected that the state tried to make stronger control
with "wild privatization", because many of the managers were Russian-speaking.
This does not seem to be the case. Large privatization was rather slow, and at the
same time commercialization gave the managers of the enterprises much freedom of
action. The managers could even buy and sell assets, and it can be assumed that
"asset stripping" took place in a quite large scale. After the election in Jun  1993 and
the strengthened position of Latvian national parties the control with "wild
privatization" was enforced. Much of the small privatization was decentralized to
local municipalities, the responsibility for many of the large and medium firms were
placed in different often sectoral oriented ministries. This gave the management of
the enterprises in cooperation with their contacts in the bureaucracy good
opportunities to arrange deals including privatization for their own benefit. Most of
the large privatization made according to the old legislation was of the type of
leasing with the option to buy. When the "cream was skimmed" they did not resist
the centralization of the organization of privatization. This was decided by the law
of privatization of March 1994. The Latvian Privatization Agency became the new
centralized authority for privatization.
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Small privatization proceeded relatively fast. The legislation was passed in
November 1991, and it covered firms below a certain size defined with different
measures - most important below 10 employees. These firms were sold for cash
through auctions. This should favor the new private capitalists belonging to th
group of non-titular Latvians. However, the national Latvian interests were stressed
in the fact that bidders had to have at least 16 years of residence in Latvia. The small
privatization proceeded quite rapidly, so that 60% of the firms were privatized in
November 1992 (World Bank,Lat-1993) and according to IMF (1995) 85% of the
total number of 4000 enterprises were privatized by 1995. Mostly the assets were
not sold but leased with an optio to buy after 5 years. Many of the firms were sold
or leased to the employees who up till an amendment of the law in February 1992
had the first right to buy (Vojevoda & Rumpis, 1993).
The employees also got a part of the ownership in some of the few large enterprises
that were privatized in the period 1991-92. In June 1992 a privatization schedule
was passed by parliament, but the procedure for formulating and approval of
privatization plans for each enterprise was very cumbersome and the administration
decentralized to various ministries was very slow so that only 46 large state owned
enterprises had been privatized in January 1994. Before the responsibility of pri-
vatization was taken over by the newly established Privatization Agency the
ministries peeded up the process so around 200 enterprises had been privatized
following the method of leasing with the option to buy (Shteinbuka, 1996).
Estonia served to a high extent as a model for the new privatization law passed in
February 1994. The government shall approve the transfer of enterprises to the
Privatization Agency. This was done for 240 enterprises in 1994. The first
international tenders was announced in November 1994 and more tenders followed
in April and September 1995 and the process accellerated somewhat in 1996. 
In November 1992 a law on vouchers were pass d, but the vouchers did not start to
be distributed before September 1993 and most were distributed in the summer of
1994. The people got one voucher for each year of living in Latvia after the War.
Prewar citizens and their descendant got on top of this 15 vouchers while 5 vouchers
were deducted from people immigrated after the War as  “payment for the use of
Latvian infrastructure". Thus, 87% of the vouchers were eligible fo  Latv an Citizens
(EIU, 2:93). By July 1995, 96,5% of the population had received 104 mill. vouchers
with a nominal value of 2.9 billion Lats (IMF 1995). It is possible to sell the
vouchers and trading started by August 1994. The market price was in the first
months less than 10% or the nominal value of 28 Lats. Like in Estonia this reflected
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partly the lack of clarity about what the vouchers could be used for. Only very few
investment funds had been formed; the legislation about voucher-privatization of
housing was not passed before July 1995; and there was also much uncertainty about
the privatization of enterprises for vouchers for a long period. Like in Estonia a
concentration of wealth took place in the first months of voucher trading when
especially poor people sold their vouchers at a low price.
The strategy of the Privatization Agency have like in Estonia been first to find a core
investor in a tender process and then to sell minority shareholdings for vouchers in
public offerings. Three enterprises were sold by this method in the first months of
1995 and another 13 companies were privatized during the second round in mid
1995 (IMF 1995). The legislation about foreign ownership of land was in the first
years quite restrictive giving foreigners only the possibility to lease for 99 years. But
except for this the legislation has been quite liberal and in December 1994 the law
allowing foreigners to buy land was ratified (EIU,95:1). 
Of the 10 largest banks 34% of the capital was owned by state owned enterprises in
June 1994. Often the banks functioned as agents for their owners to organize the
short time finance of trade flows (World Bank July 1993). In the first years the Bank
of Latvia covered the major part of the commercial banking through special
commercial branches. In December 1992 the commercial branches were transferred
to the Bank Privatization Committee. In late 1993 21 of these commercial branches
were merged in the new "Unibank". Nonperforming loans were replaced by long-
term government bonds in April 1994 and a four-stage privatization program were
implemented 1995-96.
Reprivatization was delayed because the question of citizenship was so difficult to
solve. The deadline for claims on enterprises was set to July 1992 and for housing
to March 1994. By the end of 1995 350,000 restitution claims for land in cities had
been submitted. Of these only 20% had been settled (EBRD 1996). Restitution was
most important in housing and agriculture and ike in Estonia restitution claims have
been a barrier for a fast privatization in nearly all fields. Around 40% of housing was
privatized by autumn of 1995. The main part of housing will be privatized by
vouchers. The legislation was not passed before in 1995 and housing privatization
is expected to be extended up to 1999 (IMF 1995).
Privatization of agriculture was quite fast in Latvia. In this sector there was no
national problems, because nearly all the farm workers were titular Latvians.
Privatization of land was mainly based on restitution, but there was also an element
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of employee-ownership. The process started in November 1990 by the land reform
with rules for restitution of land. Deadline for claims were June 1991. There were
around 300,000 claims for farms and small plots of land. By the property reform, in
the same month, the collective farms and state farms were transformed to joint stock
companies. The shares were divided between the workers and former owners, and
many of the large units were split up into smaller units (Abele 1996). In the spring
of 1992 about 1/3 of land was restituted, divided into 41.000 private farms with an
average area of 15 HA and 71.000 small plots with an average of 4,5 HA. At the end
of the year the numbers were 50.000 and 100.000 respectively. Some of th
collectives and state farms continued for a period as employee-owned firms with
farming and some small food-processing industries. But because of the special
legislation unfavorable for continuation of such units most of them were split into
many independent enterprises. 
The privatization process in Lithuania was quite different from the development in
Estonia and Latvia. The privatization was much faster and more comprehensive. In
fact, privatization in Lithuania has been one of the fastest in Eastern Europe. Already
at the end of 1992 56% of all assets had been privatized (EIU, 1:93). Vouchers and
employee-ownership had a more important role, and direct sale and foreign
investment have had a smaller role. Consideration for a fair distribution of ownership
was stronger, and the policy put more emphasis on the interests of the workers. The
main explanation behind this development lies in the fact that non-titular Lithuanian
groups played a limited role. Nearly the whole population was united in the fight for
independence. Once this fight was won, the nationalist parties had a much weaker
position than it was the case in Estonia and Latvia, and economic problems and
questions concerning distribution were in focus instead of the problem of a big
Russian minority. The workers were politically stronger because they were not split
in a Lithuanian and a Russian-speaking group. The independent Lithuanian
communist party had a quite strong position also in the parliament of 1990 to 1992,
and the victory of its successor, the Democratic Labor Party, at the election in 1992
showed the strength of left wing political forces.
The first privatization was in the form of transfers of shares of leased enterprises to
employees. Almost 60 enterprises were included in this program. Another early
transfer to employees was included in a law from December 1990. Enterprises with
capital exceeding a certain amount could sell up to 10% of their capital to
employees. Part of this could be paid by vouchers. 50-60% of the state enterprises
used this method in the start of privatization until July 1991, when another program
started (Frydman et. al. 1993).
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The cornerstone in the fast privatization in Lithuania was the voucher scheme. The
Law on the Initial Privatization of State-owned Property (LIPSP) was passed in
February 1991 at a time when the result of the fight for independence was far from
clear. The privatization plan was one of the elements in the fight for independence
in Lithuania. The scheme signalled determination in the struggle for economic self-
management. It included privatization of enterprises formally owned and controlled
by the central authorities in Moscow. The vouchers and the cash quotas, described
below, were given only to residents. This made an effective barrier for rubles
flowing from the rest of the former Soviet Union.
The voucher scheme was probably inspired by the Czech discussion and plan for a
similar system, but the Lithuanians were the first to implement the system. The
vouchers were distributed in April 1991, the sale of enterprises started in September
1991 and investment funds were approved in December 1991 at the time when the
Czech-voucher started. The distribution of vouchers were dependent on the age of
the citizens. The vouchers could be used both in the auctions for the small
enterprises and in the share subscriptions for the large enterprises, and in
privatization of housing. The assets were sold for a combination of cash and
vouchers. A cash quota set a limit for how much cash a person could use to bid on
the assets to be privatized. The cash limits were softened, when existing tenants bid
on their apartment, or when enterprises were not sold in the first auction. 
Small privatization of enterprises with a book value below a certain amount was
done by auction, where vouchers and cash quotas could be used. By August 1992
1300 small enterprises were privatized (WB-Lit-1993), by October 1994 the number
was 2498, and in July 1996 it was 2727 (Ministry of Economics).
From the start 10% of the shares in larg e te prises could be sold to the employees
at concessionary prices. This percentage was increased to 30% in April 1992 and in
February 1993 the new labor government increased the percentage further to 50%
of which 20% without voting rights. According to data from the Ministry of
Economics 510 large enterprises were privatiz d in the first period when employees
did not have special preferential treatment. In the next period, from April 1992 to
February 1993, 945 large enterprises were privatized of which employees did not
use their preferential status in about half of the cases. In about one third of the cases
the employees got 30% or more of the share capital. From February 1993 to
December 1995 in 83% out of 1473 large enterprises employees took over the
majority of the share capital. These enterprises represented 63% of the capital
privatized in this period. 
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In August 1992 a list of 114 state owned enterprises/objects for unrestricted sale for
foreign curency were published. By July 1995 the list had been reduced to 71
enterprises and of these were 46 sold for 27 mill Litas. This type of privatization was
relatively slow and foreign sale could only be considered as a supplement in
Lithuania. Especially the conservative opposition resisted sale to foreigners
especially concerning enterprises considered to be of strategic importance. The
opposition feared Russian take-overs. They also resisted strongly liberalization of
foreigners right to buy land. They could bloc changes because liberalization in this
field needed a constitutional two-thirds majority.
After the termination of the voucher privatization Lithuania followed in the end of
1995 the example of the two Northern countries by establishing a Privatization
Agency which should implement the privatization of the remaining assets for
privatization. According to the agency director there were ass ts for 3.8 billion Litas
to be privatized. The method would be privatization for cash. According to
government decision the first objects to follow this line of privatization were left-
overs from the earlier programs and small state shareholdings in enterprises which
had already been privatized. Also parts of the public utilities was on the list for cash
privatization (Lithuania Today: Politics & Economics, Jan. 1996).
Privatization of housing was very fast in Lithuania. The voucher system played an
important role in this process. Already in December 1992, 89% of the apartments
were in private hands (EIU, 1:93). By December 1993, 94% of the apartments
planned for privatization had been privatized (Martinavicius 1996). The fast
privatization opened up for a rapidly developing real-estate market in the cities.
Restitution was an elemnt in privatization of housing, but it was most important in
agriculture. Privatization of agriculture had many similarities with the process in
Latvia. In 1989, there were 835 collective farms and 275 state farms in Lithuania.
The same year a new law on Land Rights transferred the rights to farm 6000 small
plots of land to the farmers, typically to those with known claims on the land. In the
first round it was only the usufructus rights that was given to these new private
farmers. They were not allowed to trade the land. The Land law from July 1991
opened up for full private ownership of agricultural land, and it gave priority to
former owners or their descendant to take over the land. There w s a maximum limit
of 80 HA, the new o ner was obliged to farm the land and could not sell it within
5 years. According to Frydman et. al. (1993) the reorganization of the farms began
in November 1991 and by fall 1992 it was almost complete. The collective-workers
got special green-vouchers in relation to the number of years worked for the
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colective. In some cases the actual workers took over the collective or separate
units e.g. large dairy barns. The privatization of agriculture was quite chaotic. Many
inefficient small scale farms with unskilled people from the cities were established
resulting in a drop in production, and the uncertainty of the future for the collective
farms and the state farms resulted in bad planning and falling production. This
development caused dissatisfaction in the countryside which turned out to be
strongholds for the Democratic Labor Party at the election in 1992 (EIU, 2:93).
6. Different paths of the transition
The three Baltic Countries cannot be taken as a single model of transition. Although
there are many similarities they had different starting conditions and they followed
different paths of transition.
Estonia had an advantage since the first experiments of the market orientation of
Gorbatjovs "Perestroika" took place here. Estonians close links to Finland also eased
the transition toward Western type market economy. Both Estonia and Latvia h d
a quite well developed market economy and a quite strong light industry already in
the interwar period. However, on top of the distributional conflicts of transition
Estonia and Latvia also had the conflict between the titular population and the big
minority of Russian speaking people mainly employed in the large industries that had
the highest unemployment in the period of restructuring. From the start of the
transition Lithuania was in many respects a little behind h  two Northern Countries,
but the more homogenous population meant that the "Russian problem" did not play
an important role here.
The political development is the main transmitter of the background conditions into
the actual policy of transition. In Estonia the independence in 1991 meant a
significant change of policy from a pragmatic compromise oriented policy towar
Russia to a rather strong nationalist oriented p l cy giving the Russian minority only
limited political role. This nationalism was combined with a quite liberal market
oriented economic policy. Although the different governments were quite unstable
the economic policy was both relatively consequent and effectively implemented.
Although the basic political conditions were similar in Latvia concerning the Russian
minority, the national question to a higher degree paralyzed the political discussions
and the actual formulation and implementation of the economic transition was often
delayed by a deadlock situation in the political system. In Lithuania much of the
essential elements of the reform policy eg. privatization was formulated already
before the full independence. The workers were in a stronger position not divided
in ethnic groups, and the reaction toward the early negative results of the economic
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police was not distracted by the national question. The labor party took power 1993-
1996, but this did not delay the economic reforms. In fact, the stabilization of the
economy and essential elements of liberalization and privatization took place in this
period.
In Estonia stabilization and liberalization was closely connected to the early
introduction of the KROON and the currency board in 1992. The stable currency
worked as a nominal anchor effectively stabilizing the economy. The currency board
meant especially in the first years of transition a very narrow margin both for
monetary and fiscal policy. Later in the process inflow of foreign capital resulted in
a less restrictive monetary situation since it more than covered the deficit in trade
resulting form high imports of machinery and equipment for restructuring p oduction.
The stabilization and liberalization in Latvia followed some other paths than in
Estonia. Liberalization was not so consequently implemented especially concerning
the hard budget constraint and foreign trade. On the other hand the currency regime
was more liberal. Stabilization through fiscal policy was not so strict, but the
monetary policy connected to the floating exchange rate regim  was very tough. The
banking crisis in 1995 hid the Latvian economy hard and dampened the recovery.
Lithuania had a somewhat more hesitant stabilization nd liberalization than was the
case in Estonia and Lithuania. The politicians were under harder pressure from the
groups bearing the burden  of transition. However, pressure from the IMF, a
relatively balanced fiscal policy and a tough monetary policy resulted in a quite
effective stabilization from 1993.
In the first years privatization was quite slow in Estonia but in 1993 and 1994 there
was a considerable acceleration. It was an area of political conflict and the
development was closely related to the national question. Privatization was not
speeded up before the Russian-speaking part of the population had got l mitations
on their possibilities to benefit from privatization. This is an important explanation
why employee-ownership played a limited role in the later stages of the Estonian
privatization. The parliament made much emphasis on restitution and different
governments gave high priority to the participation of foreign capital in privatization.
In combination with the close ties to Finland and the successful stabilization and
liberalization policy this explains why Estonia belongs to the countries in Eastern
Europe with the highest foreign investments per capita.
In Latvia there was plenty of room for wild privatization where managers and the
new capitalists played a major role. In some take-overs in industry employee  played
an important role, but industrial workers were in a ak position, because of threats
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of unemployment, weak unions and low political power for the big proportion of
Russian-speaking workers. In agriculture, dominated by titular Latvians, restitution
was important, and also the employees got some possibilities. The voucher scheme
gave Latvian citizens a preferential position in relation to the group that did not get
full citizenship rights. In the early stages of privatization the industrial lobby had
good opportunities. W ith the centralization of authority at the Latvian Privatization
Agency in 1994 and the combination of selling for cash and vouchers the process
accelerated in 1995 and 1996.
Privatization in Lithuania proceeded at a high speed both for small and large
privatization, and for privatization of housing and agriculture. Privatization of public
utilities and sale to foreigners had low priority compared to Estonia and Latvia. The
transition of the legal structure and basic institutions did not follow the same speed,
however, and restructuring were proceeding quite slowly and the inflow of foreign
capital was rather low. Insiders got a big sh re of the ownership in Lithuania. It will
be interesting to see whether this will only make employee-ownership a temporary
type of ownership, or whether employees participation will be a permanent feature
of Lithuanian economy, (see Mygind 1996b).
The interaction between the different systems seems to be closer to the good circle
than to the vicious circle. In all three countries there have been some political
reaction from the population. In Estonia and Latvia the national conflict has to a
certain extent weakened and postponed this reaction, which was quite strong in
Lithuania with the victory of the labor party in 1992/93. However, this left-wing turn
did not lead to a weakening of the reform process. In all three countries the elements
of the good circle have been dominant and they have all implemented the critical
mass of reforms. There have been a successful stabilization and a  c mprehensive
liberalization in all three countries with Estonia as the frontrunner. Privatization has
been quite fast especially in Lithuania, but Estonia has by 1996 surpassed Lithuania
also in this field leaving Latvia as the latecomer. In Latvia and Lithuania the banking
crisis was a warning that the economy is still not in a stage of stable growth. Also
the influence of organized criminality in all three countries is an element telling that
there are still important elements diverging from a well functioning market economy.
There are threats and there will still be a long period ahead of transition and
restructuring of the economy. The three countries have followed different paths, but
they are all on the same broad way which in spite of some uphill driving in the first
years now looks more smooth and promising.
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